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WHY HAS ANTITRUST LAW FAILED WORKERS?
Ioana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner†
In the last several years, economists have learned about
an antitrust problem of vast scope. Far from approximating
the conditions of perfect competition as long assumed, most
labor markets are characterized by monopsony—meaning
that employers pay workers less than their productivity because workers lack a credible threat to quit and find a higherpaying job in the same market. Yet while antitrust law regulates labor monopsony in the same way as it regulates monopoly on the product market side, antitrust litigation against
employers is rare. We document both the magnitude of labor
monopsony and the paucity of cases and argue that this “litigation gap” exists because antitrust case law, which has developed through product-side litigation, is poorly tailored to
labor-side problems. We conclude with four proposals for reform of antitrust law so it can better deter labor monopsony.

I. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Monopsony Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Labor Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Labor Market Monopsony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Empirical Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE ANTITRUST LITIGATION GAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Sherman Act, Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Sherman Act, Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Clayton Act, Section 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. What Accounts for the Scarcity of Labor
Monopsony Cases? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1349
1349
1351
1352
1355
1356
1362
1363
1364
1370
1372

R

1375
1375

R

† Marinescu is Assistant Professor, School of Social Policy & Practice, University of Pennsylvania, and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of
Economic Research. Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor,
University of Chicago. Portions of this Article are drawn from a working paper.
See Ioana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal to Enhance Antitrust Protection
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Events over the last several years have drawn public
attention to employers who have used their power over labor
markets to suppress wages and control workers. In 2010, a
group of Silicon Valley tech companies, including Apple and
Google, settled a case brought against them by the Justice
Department alleging that they had agreed not to poach each
other’s employees in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1
Then, in 2014, news that Jimmy John’s, the sandwich chain,
imposed covenants not to compete on their low-wage sandwich
makers provoked a public outcry.2 Two years later the
company settled lawsuits brought by state attorneys general by
agreeing to drop the noncompetes.3 Around the same time,
academic scholarship revealed that noncompetes were
ubiquitous, even in the contracts of low-skill workers like the
sandwich workers of Jimmy John’s, despite being subject to
strict review in the common law and generally thought to be
appropriate for high-skill workers in limited circumstances.4 A
1
David Streitfeld, Engineers Allege Hiring Collusion in Silicon Valley, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/technology/
engineers-allege-hiring-collusion-in-silicon-valley.html [https://perma.cc/
VGG7-526S].
2
Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete
Clause, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/
upshot/when-the-guy-making-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html?
auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/ESB3-X4NP].
3
E.g., Will Racke, Jimmy John’s Settles Non-Compete Lawsuit, CHI. BUS. J.
(Dec. 8, 2016, 12:04 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/chicago/news/2016/
12/08/jimmy-johns-settles-non-compete-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/
MC6X-SB7U].
4
ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR
PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 7, 10 (2018),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_
from_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3JEEM4U]; Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S.
Labor Force 17–18 (U. Mich. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 18-013, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625714 [https://
perma.cc/TV79-2DWF].
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paper by two academics released in 2017 reported that
numerous franchises imposed no-poaching clauses on
franchisees;5 a year later seven franchises, including
McDonald’s and Arby’s, agreed to drop these clauses to settle a
case brought by state attorneys general.6 Meanwhile, the
Obama administration issued a report warning of
anticompetitive behavior by employers,7 and the Justice
Department warned human resource departments to avoid nopoaching arrangements.8 The media kept up the drumbeat by
reporting the ways that employers—using noncompetes,
mergers, no-poaching agreements, and other anticompetitive
devices—pushed down wages.9
These events coincided with the release of several academic
papers that document statistically the pervasiveness of labor
monopsony in the United States.10 A labor monopsony exists
5
Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer
Collusion in the Franchise Sector 6 (Princeton Univ., Indus. Relations Section,
Working Paper No. 614, 2017), https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream
/88435/dsp014f16c547g/3/614.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KKZ-R7B6].
6
Sean Higgins, Corporations Targeted for Directing Franchise Hiring, WASH.
EXAMINER (July 24, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
policy/economy/corporations-targeted-for-directing-franchise-hiring [https://
perma.cc/D48D-JSNC].
7
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF
MARKET POWER 2 (2016) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4LTZ-2ESB].
8
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3–4 (2016), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download [https://perma.cc/MM56-XLCE].
9
See Miguel Helft, Unwritten Code Rules Silicon Valley Hiring, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (June 3, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/technology/
companies/04trust.html [https://perma.cc/6CCA-MZ93]; Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Tech Firms May Find No-Poaching Pacts Costly, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014, 8:54 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/tech-firms-may-find-no-poachingpacts-costly/ [https://perma.cc/K6UY-T9PV]; supra notes 1–4, 6.
10
José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi Taska,
Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data 2, 4–7
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24395, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3133344 [https://perma.cc/
4LH7-DVFV]; Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees:
How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages? 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 24307, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3146679 [https://perma.cc/DN2P-CMGJ]; Brad
Hershbein, Claudia Macaluso & Chen Yeh, Concentration in U.S. Local Labor
Markets: Evidence from Vacancy and Employment Data 2 (Mar. 15, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://site.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj8706/
f/5166-concentration_in_u.s._local_labor_markets_evidence_from_vacancy_and_
employment_data.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JL7-PE3L]; Yue Qiu & Aaron
Sojourner, Labor-Market Concentration and Labor Compensation 4 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3312197 [https://perma.cc/QZ3J-FKCL].
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when lack of competition in the labor market enables
employers to suppress the wages of their workers.11 At one
time, economists assumed that labor markets were highly
competitive.12 If one imagines sandwich workers in a big city,
for example, the immediate image that comes to mind is that of
someone who could easily find another job if fired. That person
could work at another restaurant, or a coffee shop, or in a
warehouse, or as an Uber driver. Similarly, a lawyer can easily
quit her law firm and join another. But the new research
revealed that these assumptions were faulty.13 In fact, most
labor markets are not highly competitive.14 Most labor
markets are rural or semi-rural. Only a handful of employers
cater to a thin population spread out over a large area.15 Even
in densely populated areas, various frictions, including
noncompetition agreements, prevent workers from easily
finding new jobs.16 Taking advantage of these frictions,
employers can pay below-competitive wages without worrying
that they will lose employees to competitors. Some
commentators argue that the high degree of labor monopsony
may explain stagnant wages.17
Labor monopsony is regulated by the antitrust laws, just
as the more familiar phenomenon of monopoly is. Indeed, from
an economic standpoint, monopolization of product markets
and monopsonization of labor markets pose exactly the same
challenge to the economy—mispricing of resources (material or
human), resulting in their underemployment, which both
harms the economy and results in inequitable outcomes.
Because nominally antitrust law applies to monopsony as well
11
Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 537 (2018).
12
Id. at 541–42; see, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 108 (4th ed. 2005) (“Most labor economists believe there
are few monopsonized labor markets . . . .”).
13
Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 11, at 542.
14
Id. at 537.
15
See Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 14.
16
See infra subpart I.A.
17
See Lydia DePillis, Big Companies Used to Pay the Best Wages. Not
Anymore, CNN BUS. (Jan. 18, 2018, 12:51 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/
01/18/news/economy/big-companies-wages/index.html [https://perma.cc/
M4K9-FBR2]; Noam Scheiber & Ben Casselman, Why Is Pay Lagging? Maybe Too
Many Mergers in the Heartland, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/25/business/economy/mergers-worker-pay.html
[https://perma.cc/ZD7Z-N5LD]; Mark Whitehouse, U.S. Labor Markets Aren’t
Truly Free, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Oct. 21, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/view/articles/2018-10-21/free-markets-could-make-workers-betteroff [https://perma.cc/G3KR-4R7P].
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as to monopoly,18 one might think there would be as much
litigation against employers for labor-market monopsonization
as there has been against firms for violating antitrust law in the
product market.
But the opposite is the case. The antitrust laws have rarely
been used against employers by private litigants or the
government.19 And when they have been used—whether by
private litigants or by the government—they have been used
mostly against the most obvious forms of anticompetitive
conduct, like no-poaching agreements.20 Much under-theradar activity has been unaddressed.
Our major goal in this Article is to draw attention to, and
explain, this “litigation gap,” the gap between the largeness of
the labor monopsony problem and the smallness of the legal
response. Building on earlier work,21 we also offer four reform
proposals. We propose more liberal standards for proving
collusion under section 1 of the Sherman Act; stronger
protections against monopsony under section 2; government
review of the labor-market effects of mergers under section 7 of
the Clayton Act; and a ban on arbitration clauses that prohibit
class actions in employment contracts.
We write on a relatively clean slate. The law review
literature contains some now-dated writing that was motivated
by 1990s-era antitrust litigation against hospitals and sports
leagues.22 But because of the widespread background
18
As the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he kinship between monopoly and
monopsony suggests that similar legal standards should apply to claims of
monopolization and to claims of monopsonization.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. RossSimmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 322 (2007). Long before, in
Anderson v. Shipowners Ass’n of the Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 362–63 (1926),
the Court recognized a claim by workers based on a no-poaching agreement. In
recent years, many lower courts have recognized that the antitrust laws apply to
labor monopsony. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d
1049, 1058, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting the district court’s characterization of
the market for college athletes as a monopsony and holding that NCAA
regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason).
19
Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 11, at 570.
20
Id. at 571.
21
Marinescu & Posner, supra note †, at 2; Ioana Marinescu & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1031
(2019); Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 11.
22
See, e.g., John A. Litwinski, Regulation of Labor Market Monopsony, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 52 (2001) (arguing that “antitrust law should be
extended to outlaw or regulate firms’ abilities to exercise labor market monopsony
power” by prohibiting such firms “from using their market power to buy labor
below the price which would otherwise exist in a competitive labor buying
market”); Jeff Miles, The Nursing Shortage, Wage-Information Sharing Among
Competing Hospitals, and the Antitrust Laws: The Nurse Wages Antitrust
Litigation, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 305, 306–07 (2007) (finding that collusion
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assumption that labor markets are competitive, this litigation
did not spur a more general discussion of the effectiveness of
antitrust law for addressing labor monopsony. In the last year
or so, a few articles have begun to come to grips with the latest
economic research but have focused on relatively narrow
aspects of it, such as mergers.23 In this Article, we broaden the
focus.
Our Article is also related to a recent surge in academic
writing among antitrust scholars who argue for more robust
antitrust enforcement.24 This writing has emerged in the wake
of economic research that shows that U.S. product markets
have become significantly more concentrated over the last
several decades, in part because of weak merger review by the
U.S. government.25 Yet while authors writing in the newly
reinvigorated antitrust literature have proposed a range of
novel reforms for strengthening antitrust law, they have
ignored the problem of labor monopsony. Our approach
focuses on the major victims of economic stagnation and
widening inequality—the workers, especially lower-skill
workers.
We start in Part I with a review of the theory of labor
monopsony and the recent economic literature that documents
among hospitals to prevent the wages they pay RNs from rising explains the RNshortage phenomenon in some cities); Laura Alexander, Note, Monopsony and the
Consumer Harm Standard, 95 GEO. L.J. 1611, 1633 (2007) (arguing that courts
should recognize the legislative judgments inherent in the Sherman Act to resolve
the problems of applying antitrust law to monopsony).
23
In addition to the articles cited in supra note 9, see Suresh Naidu & Eric A.
Posner, Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law 7–8 (Oct. 14, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/naidu%20
posner%20limits%20of%20law%20conference%20draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/
93P9-WMYB]; cf. Clayton J. Masterman, Note, The Customer Is Not Always Right:
Balancing Worker and Customer Welfare in Antitrust Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1387,
1389 (2016) (analyzing the court’s forgiving tendency toward monopsonist
conduct by focusing on “agreements between employers that restrict competition
in labor markets”).
24
See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 714, 716 (2018) (arguing that all three branches of government can improve
and strengthen their application of antitrust law). For a symposium devoted to
this topic, see Jonathan B. Baker et al., Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE
L.J. 1916, 1916–20 (2018), especially the introduction. For other writings in this
vein, see TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 127–39
(2018); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 790–802
(2017).
25
See, e.g., Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are US
Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697, 700 (2019) (yes);
German
´ Guti´errez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in
the U.S. 3–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23583, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23583.pdf [https://perma.cc/39PG-RG3D]
(documenting decline of competition).
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its vast influence on labor conditions. In Part II, we discuss the
law, specifically sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
section 7 of the Clayton Act. We show how the law can be used
against labor monopsony and discuss reasons why it has fallen
short. In Part III, we propose four reforms to cure these
failures.
I
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
A.

Theory

When employers establish wages and working conditions,
they seek to minimize their labor costs while attracting the
workers they need in the production process. In a perfectly
competitive labor market, where workers can at no cost quit
and obtain comparable work at alternative employers, the employer pays a wage equal to the worker’s marginal revenue
product—the amount of value that the worker adds to the employer’s bottom line. Such a wage “clears” the market, attracting all workers willing to work in return for it and thus can
be taken as a baseline for evaluating actual labor market
conditions.26
Real-world wages deviate from the competitive ideal for
many reasons, but our focus is the problem of employer monopsony—the ability to set wages below the marginal revenue
product. There are three major sources of monopsony: concentration, search frictions, and job differentiation.
Concentration means that only one or a few employers hire
a particular kind of worker in an area where workers reside and
commute.27 When few employers exist, workers who are underpaid by their existing employer are limited in their ability to
quit and work for an alternative employer for a higher wage.
This allows the incumbent employer to suppress the wage.
Employer concentration also facilitates overt or tacit collusion,
for example, where one firm acts as a “wage leader” by periodically announcing wage increases that other firms match.28
Search frictions refer to the difficulty faced by workers of
finding new jobs if they are unsatisfied with their existing em26

See, e.g., RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMTHEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 130–45 (12th ed. 2015) (overviewing the basic economics of labor markets and monopsony).
27
See Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 3–4.
28
Cf. Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper, 276 F. Supp. 3d 811, 824–25 (N.D. Ill.
2017) (explaining a similar phenomenon in price setting), aff’d sub nom. Kleen
Prods. LLC v. Ga.-Pac. LLC, 910 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2018).
ICS:
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ployer or are fired or laid off.29 Search frictions exist because
workers may be unaware of alternative employment opportunities in the area or elsewhere; or, while they may know that
other employers are hiring, they have trouble comparing jobs
because of various intangibles like the work environment.
Even in the presence of good information and comparable jobs,
a coordination problem leads to search frictions: workers do
not know which firms other workers are applying to, so workers
will end up overapplying to some jobs and underapplying to
others. Workers who happen by chance to have applied to jobs
that many other workers have also applied to have a low
probability of getting hired, which increases the time it takes to
find a job. If finding a job is hard and risky, then workers will
settle for a low wage offer rather than keep searching.30
Job differentiation refers to the way that different employers offer workers different packages of amenities—including,
for example, shift flexibility, childcare, vacation and sick time,
and the overall atmosphere at work, such as whether it is intense, relaxed, noisy, collegial, or competitive. Workers sort
themselves across employers according to the amenities that
are offered, but as a result they may become vulnerable to wage
suppression because they cannot credibly threaten to leave one
job for another where the amenities are quite different.31
Antitrust law has traditionally been concerned with the
problem of concentration. In most antitrust cases, the plaintiff
must start by proving that the defendant possesses market
power—meaning that the defendant controls a large share of a
market and that only a few other firms control large shares as
well.32 For product markets, an example would be Coca-Cola,
which controls about 43% of the nationwide nonalcoholic beverages market.33 For labor markets, an example would be
Home Depot, which controlled 100% of the market for cargo
and freight agents in 142 commuting zones (out of the 709
29

Alan Manning, Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market, in 4B HANDBOOK
LABOR ECONOMICS 973, 976–78 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, eds., 2011)
[hereinafter Manning, Imperfect Competition]; see also ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY
IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR MARKETS 360–61 (2003) (providing an
important stimulus for the modern literature).
30
Manning, Imperfect Competition, supra note 29, at 976–78.
31
Id.
32
See Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1386 (5th
Cir. 1994); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256,
275–76 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
33
Coca-Cola Company’s Market Share in the United States from 2004 to 2018,
STATISTA (2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/225388/us-market-shareof-the-coca-cola-company-since-2004/ [https://perma.cc/2AJY-DLCU].
OF
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commuting zones throughout the United States) in 2016.34
However, antitrust law is more broadly concerned with any
friction that could allow a firm to charge prices above the competitive level for goods and services and to pay prices below the
competitive level when it buys goods, services, or labor.
Employers with monopsony power, whatever its source,
can suppress wages (and degrade working conditions) in order
to save labor costs. While some workers will quit as a result, an
employer with monopsony power gains more in reduced labor
costs than it loses from lower production. Both types of workers—those who continue working and those who quit—suffer
from this state of affairs, and there is also harm to the economy
as a result of the lower level of production.
Still, the distinction between concentration and the other
sources of labor monopsony—search frictions and job differentiation—is important. Some antitrust doctrines are directed
only to the problem of concentration. Blocking a merger, for
example, can prevent concentration, but it cannot lower search
costs or counter job differentiation. But the other sources of
labor monopsony can also play a role in antitrust analysis.
Search frictions and job differentiation can be the source of
entry barriers that preserve a firm’s monopsony, and under
antitrust law the actions of a monopsonist—for example, its
efforts to extend the monopsony into other markets—are subject to special scrutiny.35 We will abstract from these distinctions henceforth, but they should be kept in mind.36
B.

The Monopsony Landscape

Monopsony prevails in a large number of U.S. labor markets. Recent empirical work has documented this phenomenon by using the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is
widely used to assess monopoly power in the product market.37
The HHI for a product market equals the sum of the squares of
34
Based on the Burning Glass Technologies data and market definition used
in Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 4–6.
35
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 12 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/
08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZNB-54B8] [hereinafter HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES] (discussing the scrutiny used when evaluating mergers of
competing buyers).
36
Because antitrust law focuses mainly on concentration and can have only
a limited impact on the other two sources of labor monopsony, even hypothetically
perfect enforcement of antitrust law would leave a significant amount of labor
monopsony intact. For a discussion, see Naidu & Posner, supra note 23, at
13–16.
37
See Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 6–7.

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-5\CRN501.txt

1352

unknown

Seq: 10

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

28-AUG-20

8:34

[Vol. 105:1343

the market share of the firms that compete within that product
market, multiplied by 10,000.38 For example, if two firms divide the market equally, the HHI equals 5,000
(0.52 + 0.52 * 10,000). An HHI of zero represents the theoretical
ideal of perfect competition, while an HHI of 10,000 represents
a product market dominated by a single monopolist. The value
of the index is higher when there are fewer firms selling a
product or when one firm dominates the market (for example,
for two firms the HHI is higher when one firm sells 90% of
products and the other 10% than when each of the two firms
sells 50% of products)—as these are the conditions in which
the competitive harm caused by market concentration is
greatest.39
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines use the HHI to establish the
conditions under which mergers and acquisitions among competitors are lawful.40 An HHI above 1,500 means that a market
is “moderately concentrated,” and an HHI above 2,500 means
that a market is “highly concentrated.” When firms seek to
merge in a market with a high HHI and when the merger would
significantly increase the HHI, the government presumes that
the merger is anticompetitive and may block it.
The HHI for a labor market is calculated in the same way as
the HHI for a product market, except that the market share is
the firm’s share of a labor market, rather than its share of a
product market.41 To measure labor market concentration, we
look at the number of vacancies in a particular labor market,
and calculate the HHI based on each firm’s share of those
vacancies. A market where four firms post 25% of jobs each is
highly concentrated with an HHI of 2,500. But before we go
further, we should explain how labor markets are defined.
1.

Labor Markets

The labor market definition has three elements: type of job
(or skills); geographic scope; and time. First, we define a labor
market by the type of job. The empirical literature relies on a
list of “Standard Occupational Classifications” (SOC) main38

See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1039.
See id. (noting that mergers in markets with high HHI indices warrant
concerns regarding their impact on competitiveness).
40
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 5.3.
41
Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1037, 1039.
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tained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,42 and more specifically, an occupation at the six-digit SOC level, which
represents a fairly specific definition of a job or occupation.
Unfortunately, even the detailed six-digit SOC level is probably
too broad for labor market definition. For example, “accountants and auditors” (13-2011) may be excessively broad because
an experienced accountant may consider only a “senior accountant” job title position rather than the position of a junior
or entry-level accountant.43 Still, the SOC level is convenient
for empirical work; because the SOC level is probably too
broad, it also serves as a conservative assumption, with the
result that the literature likely understates the degree of labor
market concentration.
One may object that the SOC level is in fact also too narrow, at least for some workers. An accountant may tire of
accounting and apply for a job as a manager of a business or go
to medical school and start over as a doctor. However, the key
question is: when faced with lower wages, how likely is a
worker to apply to a different job or to quit a current job? The
evidence shows that workers are not very sensitive to wages
when choosing where to apply44 or whether to quit a current
job.45 This limited sensitivity of workers to wages implies that
employers have the latitude to lower wages below workers’ marginal productivity without causing a large number of workers
to quit.
Even though many occupations seem quite similar, the
costs of switching occupations is high. Workers are more likely
to switch between occupations that are similar in the kinds of
tasks that are performed. However, the dissimilarity between
tasks performed in different jobs is not the main barrier to
transition across occupations;46 this task dissimilarity ac42
See Occupational Employment Statistics, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://
www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm [https://perma.cc/Z2W2-ELUS] (last
updated Mar. 31, 2020).
43
See Ioana Marinescu & Ronald Wolthoff, Opening the Black Box of the
Matching Function: The Power of Words 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22508, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22508 [https://
perma.cc/WQZ9-ASBK].
44
José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Measuring Labor Market Power Two Ways, 109 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 317–18 (2019); Marinescu &
Wolthoff, supra note 43, at 11, 22 (finding that job titles act as a sufficient proxy
for wages in most cases, and that a positive relationship between wages and
number of applicants exists only when job titles are controlled for).
45
Manning, Imperfect Competition, supra note 29, at 1012.
46
Guido Matias Cortes & Giovanni Gallipoli, The Costs of Occupational Mobility: An Aggregate Analysis, 16 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 275, 312–13 (2018).
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counts for only 14% of the cost of switching occupations.47
Even between two very similar occupations, moves are hampered by other types of entry costs, including retraining and
occupational licensing. Removing all barriers to mobility would
increase occupational switches by about ten times.48 The upshot is that, just because two occupations seem very similar, it
does not mean that the cost of switching from one to the other
is low.
Because of high occupational switching costs, workers do
not react strongly to changes in wages across occupations. The
costs of switching across occupations can be estimated by
comparing actual occupational switches with the occupational
switches that would happen if workers simply went to the highest paying occupation. Using this reasoning, studies estimate
that switching occupations can entail a loss between half a
year and three years of earnings.49 These losses are significant, and therefore it is plausible that an employer that monopsonizes an occupation can impose a substantial wage cut
without driving away many workers.
Second, we define the geographic scope of the market as
the area where most workers work and live, and more specifically a commuting zone (CZ). Commuting zones are geographic
area definitions comprising clusters of counties that were developed by the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA),50 based on patterns of commuting. As we will discuss
below, CZs are only approximations because some workers
may commute across CZs, while others may refuse to take a job
at the far end of the CZ in which she currently works. A very
few labor markets—like the market for CEOs—may be national
or international in scope. But again the results of the studies
analyzing the impact of labor market concentration on wages
are robust to different definitions of the geographic scope of the
labor market, which suggests that the precise definition does
not matter.51
47

Id. at 278.
Id. at 302 tbl. 7.
49
Erhan Artuç & John McLaren, Trade Policy and Wage Inequality: A Structural Analysis with Occupational and Sectoral Mobility, 97 J. INT’L ECON. 278, 284
(2015); Etienne Lalé, Worker Reallocation Across Occupations: Confronting Data
with Theory, 44 LABOUR ECON. 51, 59 (2017) (“We find that [mobility] costs fluctuate between 54 and 67% of annual earnings . . . .”).
50
See Commuting Zones and Labor Market Areas, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://
www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-market-areas/
[https://perma.cc/E2KR-2EZ2] (last updated Mar. 26, 2019).
51
Benmelech et al., supra note 10, at 13–14; Hershbein et al., supra note 10,
at 12–13; Kevin Rinz, Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earn48
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Third, the labor market must be limited in time because
job seekers can afford to be unemployed only for a limited
period of time. The median duration of unemployment was
about a quarter of a year in 2016.52 In sum, we define a labor
market as the combination of a six-digit SOC occupation, a
commuting zone, and a quarter, for example, accountants and
auditors in Philadelphia in the first quarter of 2016.
2.

Labor Market Monopsony

Labor market monopsony prevails when employers can pay
workers wages below the competitive rate because of their high
switch costs. As we noted above, monopsony has three
sources: concentration, search frictions, and job differentiation. It is convenient to distinguish concentration because of
the central role that it plays in antitrust, so henceforth we will
refer to concentration and non-concentration (that is, search
frictions or job differentiation) sources of monopsony.
Elasticity. The most direct measure of labor market monopsony is labor supply elasticity, which refers to workers’ sensitivity to wages. Elasticity of infinity means that a worker will
quit (or not take a job) if the wage is reduced even a tiny
amount below the competitive wage, while elasticity of zero
means that a worker will stay put (or still take a job) even if the
wage is reduced significantly. As a rough rule of thumb, and
drawing on the product-market literature, we say that a monopsony exists—that is, a problem that deserves legal attention
of some sort—if a small but significant nontransitory reduction
in wages (5% is a rule of thumb) will not result in a substantial
reduction in employment, given quitting and hiring rates.53 As
a rough point of reference, consider an elasticity of two, which
is common across labor markets.54 An elasticity of two means
that a 10% increase in wages entails a 20% increase in a firm’s
employment. If the elasticity is below two, then an employer
that monopsonizes a labor market can profitably reduce wages
by 5%.
HHI. The HHI for a labor market is calculated in the same
way as the HHI for a product market, except that the market
share is the firm’s share of a labor market, rather than its share
ings Mobility 30 (Ctr. for Admin. Records Research & Applications, Working Paper
2018-10, 2018); Qiu & Sojourner, supra note 10, at 21–22.
52
Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 9.
53
Cf. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 4.1 (describing the rule
for product markets); Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 11, at 574–75.
54
Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 12.
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of a product market. To measure labor market concentration,
we look at the number of vacancies in a particular labor market
and calculate the HHI based on each firm’s share of those
vacancies. A market where four firms post 25% of jobs each is
highly concentrated with an HHI of 2,500.
Relationship between Elasticity and HHI. The elasticity
measure reflects all three sources of monopsony power, while
the HHI measures only concentration. Thus, for any market,
the HHI necessarily understates employer power. Nonetheless,
HHI and elasticity are correlated. Across all labor markets, a
10% increase in HHI is associated with a 2.2% decrease in a
measure of the labor supply elasticity.55 Across markets,
wages decline with HHI, even after we control for the labor
supply elasticity: this shows that concentration is an important
determinant of wages, even after we account for labor market
frictions captured by the labor supply elasticity.56 Because of
the traditional role of HHI in antitrust enforcement, we will
focus on HHI in this Article.
Market power. Any labor market can be more or less
monopsonistic, but there is another variable of interest: the
power of any particular employer, which is usually measured
in terms of market share. If a market is highly concentrated,
there will typically be one, two, or three very large employers,
and these employers will usually be the focus of antitrust law.
It is also possible for a market to be less highly concentrated
but still inelastic—for example, if there are high job search
costs. These markets pose a challenge to antitrust enforcement because the various small employers probably do not
take any actions that could be penalized, and hence deterred,
in a practical way.
C.

Empirical Findings

We can now turn to the results of the empirical literature.
According to a leading study, in 2016, labor market concentration exceeded the high concentration threshold of 2,500 HHI in
60% of U.S. labor markets.57 These highly concentrated markets account for 20% of U.S. employment. Larger cities generally have lower labor market concentration while labor markets
55
Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum, supra note 44, at 320. In this paper, the
labor supply elasticity is approximated by the application elasticity, i.e., the percent increase in applications that results from a percent increase in the advertised
wage.
56
Id.
57
Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 2.
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are more concentrated in rural areas: for example, the labor
markets in the Chicago commuting zone have a low average
concentration (HHI of 301), while the labor markets in Kankakee and Iroquois counties (which form a commuting zone immediately south of the Chicago commuting zone) have a very
high average concentration (HHI of 5,184, see red area in the
Figure 1 below58). More broadly, the five least concentrated
commuting zones have an average HHI below 400 and are: Los
Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Chicago.
The five most concentrated commuting zones are all in rural
areas and have an average HHI above 8,800. This geographical
variation reflects a well-understood fact about commuting:
there is only so far that people are willing to commute. So in a
densely populated area, there will be more employers, and
hence more competition among employers for workers. Labor
market concentration also varies across regions of the country,
with higher concentration across a broad swath of the middle
of the country.

HHI Concentration Category
Very High (5000-10000)
High (2500-5000)
Moderate (1500-2500)
Low (0-1500)
No data

Figure 1. Average HHI by commuting zone, based on vacancy shares. This
figure shows the average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by commuting zone
code for the top 200 SOC-6 occupations (ranked based on the number of vacancies) over the period 2016Q1-2016Q4 in the Burning Glass Technologies dataset.
The categories we use for HHI concentration levels are: “Low”: HHI between 0 and
1500; “Moderate”: HHI between 1500 and 2500; “High”: HHI between 2500 and
5000; “Very High”: HHI between 5000 and 10000. These categories correspond to
the DOJ/FTC guidelines, except that we add the additional distinction between
high and very high concentration levels around the 5,000 HHI threshold. Market
shares are defined as the sum of vacancies by a given firm in a given market (658

See id. at fig. 1.
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digit SOC by commuting zone) and year-quarter divided by total vacancies posted
in that market and year-quarter.

Among the thirty largest occupations, the least concentrated occupation is “registered nurses” while the most concentrated is “marketing managers.”59 Among these common
occupations, the top seven most concentrated occupations—
marketing managers, management analysts, computer systems analysts, financial analysts, information security analysts, web developers, software developers who specialize in
applications—are all highly skilled, but below there are a variety of high- and low-skilled occupations, including medical and
health service managers, and customer service representatives. These findings accord with economic theory. Many different employers hire low-skill workers such as customer
service representatives or secretaries and administrative assistants, while a high-skill worker invests in skills that may be
suitable for only a small number of employers. But labor monopsony harms low-skill workers as well, especially in rural
areas where few employers of any kind exist in any given commuting zone.
Higher concentration is associated with lower wages for
workers. An increase in HHI by 10% in a given labor market is
associated with a decrease in posted wages for job vacancies by
0.4% to 1.5%.60 To illustrate, a legal secretary is looking for a
job in Columbus, Ohio. The average pay there is about
$33,000 a year, and the HHI is 2,969, already above the high
concentration threshold. Suppose that, following a merger of
law firms, the HHI increases by 27% to 3,762. This means that
the wage for a legal secretary would decrease by up to
1.5% * 2.7 * 33,000 = $1,337. Thus, as a result of the merger,
new legal secretary jobs in Columbus, Ohio would pay $31,663
per year instead of $33,000, all else equal.
To understand the effect of concentration on a worker’s life,
we can look to a farm equipment mechanic named Matt Gies,
whose woes were chronicled in a New York Times article.61 Mr.
Gies was raised on a farm and always wanted to repair farm
equipment. As a young man, he was hired by a local farm
equipment distributor. Later, Mr. Gies’s employer was pur59

Id. at fig. 4.
José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), http://
www.marinescu.eu/AzarMarinescuSteinbaum.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBZ6B84Y].
61
Scheiber & Casselman, supra note 17.
60
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chased by a bigger corporation, Riesterer & Schnell. His hours
increased and his pay stayed almost flat, so he quit. However,
he could not find another job as a farm equipment mechanic
because most of these jobs were offered by Riesterer & Schnell,
which owned several local distributors. This pattern is consistent with the very high level of labor market concentration for
farm equipment mechanics in the whole U.S.62 While Mr. Gies
was able to find other jobs, these jobs did not bring him the
same satisfaction, and at the time that the New York Times
published its article about him, he was still looking for a job as
a farm equipment mechanic, while doing occasional freelance
repair work for acquaintances.
It is sometimes assumed that labor market and product
market concentration coincide, as a result of which antitrust
enforcement aimed at product market concentration would
take care of labor market concentration as well. However, the
data shows that labor market concentration is distinct from
product market concentration and that it is labor market concentration rather than product market concentration that
tends to depress wages.63 While labor market concentration is
higher for more product-concentrated industries than for less
product-concentrated industries, this pattern is not very
strong.64 For example, plastic product manufacturing and cement and concrete product manufacturing both have a product
market HHI below the low concentration threshold. However,
the top occupation in plastics, “Molding, Coremaking, and
Casting Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and
Plastic,” has an HHI above 5,000.65 By contrast, the top occupation in cement and concrete is “Heavy and Tractor-Trailer
Truck Drivers,” which has a very low labor market HHI below
500.66 A more familiar example is mining. Mines are often the
only significant employers in a commuting zone, and hence the
labor market for skilled miners is typically concentrated; but
mines sell their products into national or global markets that
are usually competitive. This shows that antitrust enforcement
cannot rely on product market concentration to capture the
degree of competition in the labor market.
62

Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum, supra note 60, at app. fig. A.3.
See Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, at 19 (“Labor
market concentration is different from product market concentration, and occupational wages are lower when labor market concentration is higher, not when
product market concentration is higher.”).
64
Id. at 18.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 19.
63
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The recent discovery that most labor markets are highly
concentrated led some commentators to speculate that rising
labor market concentration explains the stagnation of wages
since the 1990s.67 But the story is more complex. Labor market concentration decreased between 2000 and 2010 and has
increased after 2010.68 If we define a labor market by an industry (and commuting zone) rather than an occupation (and
commuting zone), the data allow us to go back further in time
to 1970 and indicates that industry-based labor market concentration decreased between 1970 and 2010 before shifting
direction in 2010.69 The decline in industry-based labor market concentration is partly driven by the increasing entry of
large firms in commuting zones, for example, Walmart. Because concentration has decreased since 2000, rising concentration alone cannot explain wage stagnation. However, this is
no reason for lax antitrust enforcement since labor market concentration has suppressed wages even in the recent period during which concentration has been lower than in the early
2000s.70
For another angle on the problem of monopsony, we can
look at elasticity numbers rather than HHI. One way of measuring the labor supply elasticity is to estimate how the number of applications changes when posted wages increases. The
average elasticity across markets is about 0.42, implying that a
10% increase in posted wages increases the number of applicants to a vacancy by 4.2%.71 For 80% of workers living in the
less densely populated commuting zones, the elasticity is very
small and close to zero. Even in the 1% most densely populated areas, the elasticity is no greater than five, a level well
below ten, a figure that roughly approximates perfect competition.72 Thus, the common intuition that cities have perfectly
competitive markets turns out to be false.
The negative relationship between labor market concentration and wages in the United States has been confirmed using
different data sources, time periods, and definitions of the la67
See Scheiber & Casselman, supra note 17 (“In the past few years, a growing
chorus of economists has expressed concern that consolidation among companies . . . could help explain the wage stagnation that has become a vexing feature
of the labor market since the late 1990s.”).
68
Qiu & Sojourner, supra note 10, at 40.
69
Hershbein et al., supra note 10, at 16; Rinz, supra note 51, at 13.
70
Rinz, supra note 51, at 26.
71
Azar, Marinescu & Steinbaum, supra note 44, at 317.
72
Id. at 320–21; Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 11, at 565.
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bor market.73 Importantly, some of these studies used administrative data on employment, which shows that potential
issues with job vacancies data are not driving the results.
Studies have also specifically investigated the impact of mergers. One recent study looks at mergers from 1978 to 2016
between competing manufacturing firms that each owned at
least one plant in a local labor market.74 The study measured
how the mergers increased HHI and then measured the wage
impact of the HHI increase induced by mergers.75 The study
found that the mergers, through their effect on HHI, suppressed wages at an economically substantive and statistically
significant level.76 Another study focuses on hospital mergers
and shows that when the merger significantly increases the
labor market HHI, the wages of specialized personnel decrease.77 That study also found that the wages of skilled hospital personnel are about 5% lower in markets above 2,500 HHI
compared to perfectly competitive markets, and these same
wages are about 18% lower in monopsony labor markets with
10,000 HHI. These additional studies of monopsony also show
that when unionization is higher, the negative wage impact of
HHI78 and HHI-increasing mergers79 is lessened. While concentration could be associated with uncontrolled-for variables
that reduce wages, the negative impact of mergers on wages
confirm that market power is one of the reasons why we observe a negative association between wages and concentration.
Theory predicts that labor market concentration should
decrease employment as well as wages. However, determining
whether concentration reduces employment because of monopsony is tricky because concentration could also lower employment as a result of efficiencies: for example, two hospitals
that merge no longer need two accounting departments and
thus may be able to fire accountants and support staff without
losing productivity. The study of hospital mergers found negative wage effects but no output or employment effects.80 This
null effect on output and employment makes the anticompeti73
See Benmelech et al., supra note 10, at 4; Hershbein et al., supra note 10,
at 3; Rinz, supra note 51, at 19.
74
Benmelech et al., supra note 10, at 2.
75
Id. at 2–3.
76
Id. at 18.
77
Elena Prager & Matt Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from Hospitals 14 (Feb. 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington Center for
Equitable Growth, unpublished manuscript).
78
Benmelech et al., supra note 10, at 20.
79
Prager & Schmitt, supra note 77, at 25.
80
Id. at 43.
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tive wage suppression effect more convincing since it is difficult
to ascribe the wage reduction to a decline in labor demand for
specialized hospital personnel. Wages plausibly decreased because workers’ bargaining power declined in the face of higher
labor market concentration. Even when employment does not
decline as a result of an increase in concentration, there are
other ways employers can use their better competitive position:
for example, evidence from all U.S. labor markets shows that,
when labor market concentration increases, employers require
higher skill levels for the same type of job.81 To the extent that
employers can hire more skilled workers for the same or a lower
wage level, labor market concentration depresses the rewards
to productive work even more than is apparent by just looking
at the average wage in an occupation.
While the unemployment rate in the U.S. economy in January 2019 is very low at 4%, the share of working age Americans who participate in the labor market is still below the level
prior to the 2008 recession.82 Low wages from the monopsony
power exercised by employers may discourage workers from
looking for jobs.
Overall, given the negative relationship between labor market concentration and wages, and the pervasiveness of labor
market concentration in the United States, the time is ripe for
labor-side antitrust litigation.
II
THE ANTITRUST LITIGATION GAP
Antitrust law is embodied in statutes that prohibit anticompetitive practices in any kind of market. The most important of these statutes are section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits “restraint of trade;”83 section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits monopolization;84 and section 7 of the Clayton
Act, which prohibits mergers that substantially lessen competition.85 The courts have acknowledged that the law applies to
81

Hershbein et al., supra note 10, at 3.
Compare Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—January 2019 (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_02012019.htm [https://perma.cc/8SQV-CW89] (marking the
labor force participation rate at 63.2% and the unemployment rate at 4% in
January 2019), with Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment
Situation—November 2007 (Dec. 7, 2007), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_12072007.pdf [https://perma.cc/E29N-3LT3] (marking the labor force participation rate at 66.1% and the unemployment rate at 4.7%).
83
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
84
Id. § 2.
85
Id. § 18.
82
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labor markets as well as to product and other markets, and on
a number of occasions employers have been held liable for
anticompetitive labor market practices or settled lawsuits that
challenged such practices.86 But cases against labor monopsonists are extremely rare. In this Part, we provide the legal
background and then turn to explanation.
A.

The Law

The Sherman Act is a short, ambiguous statute that
sought to tackle the problem of market concentration during
the Gilded Age. Politicians and commentators at the time did
not make a sharp distinction between product markets and
labor markets. They worried that the immense trusts that monopolized sectors of the economy—oil, steel, sugar, railroads—
posed a broad economic and political threat.87 The word “monopsony” would not be coined until decades later, but everyone
understood that the trusts could suppress the wages of workers as well as raise the prices of goods.88 Thus, when section 1
declares in broad terms that “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal,”89 it refers to restraints of
trade that suppress wages as well as restraints of trade that
raise prices. Likewise, when section 2 imposes penalties on
“[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
86
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
481 (1992) (applying the Sherman Act to a product market); United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665–66 (1965) (“One group of employers may
not conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and the union is liable
with the employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy.”); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A]s a general matter, the antitrust laws may apply to restraints on competition in non-unionized labor
markets.”).
87
See Robert H. Jerry, II & Donald E. Knebel, Antitrust and Employer Restraints in Labor Markets, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 173, 184–85 (arguing that Senator
Sherman likely did not intend for the Sherman Act to apply to labor markets,
highlighting the limited view of Commerce Clause power then prevalent).
88
WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 58–59, 70 (1965). At the same time, organized labor did
not lobby for the Sherman Act or demand antitrust investigations. Unions realized that an employer may refuse to raise wages because it feared that higher
labor costs would force it to raise prices and lose market share, and that therefore
combinations of employers may be more willing to raise wages than individual
employers. For a contemporary account, see 1 ARTHUR J. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS 247–49 (1901); and for a more recent history, see DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY STRUGGLE 21-32 (2 ed. 1980).
89
15 U.S.C. § 1.
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to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce,”90 it encompasses monopsonization as well as monopolization. Similarly,
the Clayton Act of 1914, which strengthened antitrust law,
made no distinction between product and labor markets.91
Section 7 prohibits stock acquisitions where “the effect of such
acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.”92 The Supreme Court has confirmed that antitrust law applies to labor markets in the same
way that it applies to product markets.93 Thus, one would
expect similar patterns of litigation with respect to both
markets.
1.

Sherman Act, Section 1

Product markets. Under section 1, firms are prohibited
from entering agreements that have an anticompetitive effect.
Some agreements are presumptively (“per se”) illegal because
they are very likely to stifle competition.94 Most price-fixing
agreements are per se illegal because they prevent price competition, though there are some unusual cases where pricefixing may be necessary for the goods to be produced.95 Agreements to divide a market geographically or to limit competition
over customers are also typically per se illegal.96 However,
most agreements are more complex and require a “rule of reason analysis,” where the court must determine that the conspirators possess sufficient market power to be able to restrain
competition, and that the agreement lacks a procompetitive
justification.97 Vertical restraints of trade—agreements between parties at different locations on the distribution chain—
are subject to rule of reason analysis.98 Because the parties to
90

Id. § 2.
See id. § 18 (simply referring to markets and making no distinction between product and labor markets).
92
Id. § 18.
93
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
94
See Nat’l. Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(“[There are] agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their
illegality . . . they are ‘illegal per se.’”).
95
See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979) (holding that “[j]oint ventures and other cooperative arrangements
are . . . not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the
agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all” (emphasis added)).
96
See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 244–45
(1899).
97
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018).
98
Shubha Ghosh, Vertical Restraints, Competition and the Rule of Reason, in
4 ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 213 (Keith Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010).
91

R
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the agreement do not compete, the agreement is not obviously
anticompetitive, and so then the question becomes whether the
agreement enables one party (or both parties) to block competition from its (or their) competitors.99
Courts routinely adjudicate section 1 product market
cases. A Westlaw search suggests about fifty cases per year.100
The cases are far too diverse to summarize, but a few general
points can be made. Defendants include many of the largest
and most important corporations in the United States. Many of
the cases involve blatant antitrust violations (some of which
resulted in criminal prosecution), where top executives met
secretly to set prices or carve out product or geographic markets. A huge number of cases involve more subtle settings,
where, for example, competitors exchange pricing information,
conduct joint ventures, participate in trade associations, and
agree with upstream suppliers or downstream buyers to limit
resale, control quality, refuse to deal with competitors, and so
on.
Labor markets. Section 1 applies to agreements to restrain
competition in labor markets in the same way as it applies to
product markets. Plaintiffs benefit from the per se rule when
the agreement involves simple wage-fixing agreements.101 Otherwise, with a few exceptions,102 they have been forced to contend with the rule of reason. They must thus show that the
defendants enjoy market power sufficient for them to restrain
labor market competition, and that the agreement actually hinders rather than advances competition.
Courts rarely adjudicate section 1 labor market cases. A
Westlaw search suggests about six cases per year, about a
tenth of the results for product market cases.103 And about
half of these cases involve the special setting of sports
leagues.104 In the sports league cases, a league—the National
Football League, the National Collegiate Athletic Association—
99

See Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 136.
Based on a Westlaw search for “section /3 1 /3 sherman +1 act & product
+1 market” (January 18, 2019), which yielded 52 hits for the last year and 176
hits for the last three years.
101
See Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 728 F. Supp. 2d 130, 162 (N.D.N.Y.
2010) (denying motion to dismiss per se wage-fixing claim).
102
See infra section III.A.2, on franchise no-poaching cases.
103
Based on a Westlaw search for “section /3 1 /3 sherman +1 act & labor +1
market” (January 18, 2019), which yielded 6 hits for the last year and 17 hits for
the last three years.
104
Based on a Westlaw search for “section /3 1 /3 sherman +1 act & labor +1
market & league” (January 18, 2019), which yielded 4 hits for the last year and 10
for the last three years.
100
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coordinates various businesses that operate teams that compete against each other. The league agreement may restrict
competition in multiple ways, for example, by regulating how
much the teams pay players—in the NCAA case, the teams pay
the players nothing.105 Courts use rule of reason analysis to
distinguish restrictions that are necessary to ensure that
league play is possible and those that merely suppress compensation for athletes.
The remaining cases are more straightforward lawsuits
against competitors in a particular industry who are accused of
holding down wages. In Fleischman v. Albany Medical Center,
for example, a class of registered nurses accused hospitals in
the Albany area of agreeing to suppress wages for these employees.106 There are a handful of other such cases, mainly in
the hospital industry.107
An instructive case is Todd v. Exxon Corp.,108 which shows
the barriers facing plaintiffs who seek relief from monopsony.
Employees of fourteen oil and petrochemical companies alleged
that the companies exchanged salary information for nonunion
managerial, professional, and technical (MPT) employees in the
industry as a part of a conspiracy to suppress wages.109 The
plaintiffs argued that the companies, which jointly employed
80–90% of these employees, used the information to determine
wages.110 The plaintiff provided statistical evidence that one of
the defendants, Exxon, reduced pay over the relevant time period while keeping it in line with its competitors.111
The district court dismissed the case for several reasons.
First, it said that the plaintiff failed to plausibly define what it
called the “product market”—it meant the labor market—because the employees are not “reasonably interchangeable.”112
Second, it believed that the relevant labor market must encompass every industry in which the MPT employees could obtain
jobs—not just the oil industry—and thus the actual market
share of the defendants was much less than 80–90%.113 Third,
the court held that the claim depended on the possibility of
105
See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2015) (vacating the district court’s judgment that required the NCAA to allow
its member schools to pay student athletes up to $5,000 per year).
106
728 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
107
For a discussion, see Miles, supra note 22.
108
126 F. Supp. 2d 321, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
109
Id. at 322–23.
110
Id. at 323.
111
Id. at 323–24.
112
Id. at 325.
113
See id. at 325–26.
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tacit coordination, but this was impossible because the market
was not concentrated. It added that the plaintiffs had also
failed to show that “demand for these ‘products’ is inelastic.”114
Fourth, it argued that Exxon’s wage-setting behavior could
have been unilateral rather than pursuant to agreement, and
hence the plaintiff had failed to allege an agreement that could
survive a motion to dismiss.115
The court (or possibly the lawyers who represented the
plaintiff class, or everyone) was seriously confused. While it is
true that the plaintiff lumped together different types of employees—lawyers and engineers, for example—each occupation
could certainly be a labor market, and there is no requirement
that employees within each market be identical or fungible,
whatever that might mean. Moreover, an MPT labor market (or
group of labor markets) limited to the oil industry could exist if,
as the plaintiffs alleged, there were special characteristics of
that industry that required experience and training to master,
as is likely the case. The court’s reference to demand inelasticity was also inapposite: the question was whether the supply of
labor was inelastic in the sense that if wages were reduced in
the claimed labor market(s), employees would have refrained
from finding work elsewhere. Finally, the claim did not depend
on agreement to suppress wages but agreement to share information, which was clearly alleged.116 The question whether
the agreement to share information affected wages was a matter for trial. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by then-Judge
Sonia Sotomayor, reversed on roughly these grounds, though it
too incorrectly referred to the labor market as a product market
(probably because the plaintiffs did as well).117
While the Court of Appeals rode to the rescue, the district
court’s opinion suggests some reasons why this type of case is
so rare. The district judge clearly held a widespread—but incorrect—belief that labor markets are competitive, and that
employees are not normally confined to a particular industry.
Thus, he found reasonable allegations to be implausible. He
also tripped over the product-side analogies and as a result
made a hash of the economics of the plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiffs have enjoyed more success with lawsuits against
employers who have entered no-poaching agreements—agreements not to try to hire away each other’s employees. In 2010,
114
115
116
117

Id. at 327.
Id.
See id. at 323.
See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 200–04, 214 (2d Cir. 2001).
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the government sued various tech firms for entering no-poaching agreement, which the firms settled.118 Piggyback litigation
was also successful.119 Plaintiffs were helped by the egregiousness of the firms’ behavior—express promises by the tech companies’ CEOs not to recruit each other’s employees.120
Claims in more complex cases, in which agreements not to
recruit are, for example, ancillary to settlements or other transactions, have been less successful.121 In Eichorn v. AT&T
Corp., AT&T sold one of its subsidiaries to another company,
and as part of the transaction agreed not to hire or solicit any of
the more highly compensated employees of that subsidiary for
eight months.122 The employees sued, arguing that the nopoaching agreement violated section 1. The court evaluated
the transaction under the rule of reason standard because the
agreement was ancillary to the sale of the company and held in
favor of the defendants.123 A crucial part of its analysis was its
rejection of the plaintiffs’ market definition, which was “potential employers within a 35 mile radius of Holmdel/Middletown
with the capacity and capability of employing or utilizing large
numbers of persons with specialized experience in high speed
data communications equipment of the sort Paradyne [the subsidiary] develops and makes.”124 The court said that the mar118
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High
Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation
Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee
[https://perma.cc/NU35-7N25].
119
In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (N.D.
Cal. 2015); United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1032 (N.D. Cal.
2013); In re High–Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107–08
(N.D. Cal. 2012).
120
See eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 1035–36; In re High–Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
121
See, e.g., Hanger v. Berkley Grp., Inc., No. 5:13–cv–113, 2015 WL
3439255, at *12 (W.D. Va. May 28, 2015) (holding that in failing to define the
proper labor market, plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible claim under section 1 of
the Sherman Act); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 868 (M.D. Tenn.
1980) (holding that an agreement by a corporation selling one of its divisions to
not rehire any managerial employee who refused employment with the buying
corporation was not a violation of the Sherman Act). But see Roman v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 543, 545 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court’s
dismissal of antitrust complaint and holding that alleging (i) that illegal agreement
was only reason the plaintiff was not hired by competitor, (ii) that market for the
plaintiff’s engineer services was impeded, and (iii) that illegal agreement prevented
the plaintiff from selling services to highest bidder, was sufficient for antitrust
standing).
122
248 F.3d 131, 136–37 (3d Cir. 2001).
123
Id. at 144, 150–51.
124
Id. at 147.
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ket definition should “include[ ] all those technology companies
and network services providers who actively compete for employees with the skills and training possessed by plaintiffs.”125
It added that “there are over twenty companies that compete for
employees with plaintiffs’ technical skills. Additionally[,] there
are a ‘vast number of jobs’ nationwide for plaintiffs with more
generalized work and educational experience.”126 With such a
broad market definition, AT&T lacked market power. But this
market definition is too broad. Most workers do not move far
away to find new jobs,127 and when specialized skills are not
transferable, the employer exercises market power.
Courts have also stumbled in cases involving no-poaching
agreements within franchises. Some old doctrine suggests that
franchises should be treated as a “single entity”; no-poaching
agreements imposed by the franchisor on franchisees cannot
be a violation of section 1 as there cannot be a one-party
“agreement.”128 More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that the single entity doctrine honors a legal fiction,129
one that allows firms to collude to suppress wages, and has
been taken advantage of by many franchises.130 In the wake of
the state actions against franchise no-poaching agreements,
lawyers have filed class actions against numerous
franchises.131 These cases are at a very early stage, but they do
suggest that the barrier to section 1 litigation has begun to
erode.132

125

Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 148 n.5.
127
See Alan Manning and Barbara Petrongolo, How Local Are Labor Markets?
Evidence from a Spatial Job Search Model, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 2877, 2905 (2017);
Ioana Marinescu & Roland Rathelot, Mismatch Unemployment and the Geography
of Job Search, 10 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 42, 46–51 (2018).
128
See, e.g., Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1032–34
(D. Nev. 1992), 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting motion to dismiss on
section 2 claim where the plaintiff, who complained that he was terminated without good cause by an employer who allegedly had labor market power, failed to
allege an anticompetitive act).
129
See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010).
130
Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 5, at 21–22.
131
See Erin Mulvaney, Thinking About a ‘No-Poach’ Agreement? What Employers Should Know, LAW.COM: NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 26, 2018, 1:13 PM), https://
www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/10/26/thinking-about-a-no-poachagreement-what-employers-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/3NFK-LFMA].
132
For further discussion of the franchise no-poach cases, see Eric A. Posner,
The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in Employment Contracts
26-27 (Sept. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3453433 [https://perma.cc/VUT3-CFZS].
126
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Sherman Act, Section 2

Product Markets. Section 2 prohibits firms from obtaining
or maintaining monopolies through anticompetitive means—
rather than “naturally” or in pro-competitive ways, for example,
through innovation.133 A typical section 2 case involves a defendant who already monopolizes a product market and is accused of using its monopoly power to block other firms from
entering the market or to extend its monopoly power into new
markets.134 The plaintiff must normally define a product market, establish that the defendant controls a large share of that
market, and prove that the defendant obtained or maintained
that monopoly in an illegitimate way.135
Section 2 product-market cases are adjudicated almost as
frequently as section 1 product-market cases—about forty to
fifty per year.136 But they can be hard to prove because allegedly anticompetitive behavior can frequently be given a business justification. For example, a monopolist that gives
discounts to buyers who commit to a large volume of its products could be accused of trying to maintain its monopoly by
depriving market entrants of demand. But it might also be
cheaper to sell to large-volume buyers than to small-volume
buyers. Monopolists who are accused of extending their monopolies to new markets can argue that they are simply offering
buyers in one market the convenience of transacting with the
same seller in another market. Still, there have been many
notable section 2 cases—including the government’s case
against Microsoft, which monopolized the market for operating
systems for IBM-clone personal computers.137
Labor Markets. Plaintiffs should similarly be able to bring
section 2 cases against employers who monopsonize labor markets by defining a labor market, establishing that the employer
controls a large share of the labor market, and proving that the
133

See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45, 64 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (explaining that the section 2 claims made against Microsoft were on the
basis that they had an existing monopoly in the area of PC operating systems and
further used that monopoly to gain a new monopoly in the market for internet
browsers).
135
See, e.g., id. at 51–56, 58–59 (breaking down the court’s legal analysis of
whether Microsoft might have violated section 2 by first analyzing the “[m]arket
definition,” followed by an analysis of “[m]arket power,” ended by an analysis of
“[a]nticompetitive [c]onduct”).
136
Based on a Westlaw search of “section /3 2 /3 sherman & product +1
market” (January 24, 2019), which yielded 50 hits for the last year and 174 hits
for the last three years.
137
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 46.
134
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employer has obtained or maintained that monopsony by engaging in anticompetitive acts. However, section 2 labor monopsony cases are extremely rare. A Westlaw search yielded
only two cases in the last year and five cases over the last three
years.138
The results of the Westlaw search probably understate the
problem. We have not found a single section 2 labor monopsony case, ever, in which the claim survived a summary judgment motion. And nearly all the cases we have found are ones
in which the section 2 claim is tacked on to a more substantive
claim, like a section 1 collusion claim or a nonantitrust claim
relating to a garden-variety employment-law dispute. In most
of these cases, the plaintiff failed to define a labor market or to
defend his or her definition or failed to identify an anticompetitive act. In other cases, the plaintiff lacked standing.
A few examples illuminate the dismal landscape. In Thomsen v. Western Electric Co., employees of Western Electric sued
that company, its parent, AT&T, and another subsidiary, Pacific Telephone, for violating the antitrust laws by agreeing not
to hire each other’s employees.139 The court rejected a section
1 claim because the three companies were a single entity, and a
single entity cannot conspire with itself.140 On the section 2
issue, the employees lacked antitrust injury because they accused the defendants of monopolizing the product market (telephone service) rather than the labor market, which they should
have identified and defined as craft telephone workers in the
relevant geographic market.141 The court’s view is reasonable:
a firm that monopolizes the product market harms consumers
but does not necessarily harm workers; indeed, the workers
might benefit if managers decide to share the monopoly profits
with them and, in any event, will not be harmed if the labor
market is competitive. Thus, there is no antitrust injury.142
The section 2 claim also failed because a company’s internal
policy not to allow employees to move among its divisions did
not reduce competition as understood in antitrust policy,
which encourages independent employers to compete with
138
Based on a Westlaw search of “section /3 2 /3 sherman & labor +1 market”
(January 24, 2019). This search, like the earlier ones, should be taken with many
grains of salt because of variations in how judges write opinions and the types of
issues that arise in these cases, but they give one a rough sense of litigation
patterns.
139
680 F.2d 1263,1265 (9th Cir. 1982).
140
Id. at 1266.
141
Id. at 1267.
142
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1977).
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each other for workers but does not require intrafirm competition.143 Thus, even if the employees had properly defined a
labor market, they might still have lost.
In Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hospital,
a group of anesthesia nurses sued hospitals that had “outsourced” them—fired them and then rehired them through various intermediaries that directly employed them.144 The
nurses alleged that their terminations were the result of a conspiracy between anesthesia doctors—who sought to eliminate
competition from the lower-paid nurses—and the hospitals,
who passed on the increased cost to Medicare. The court
wrongly held that to show antitrust injury the nurses must
show that anesthesia prices would increase, which they could
not—but in any event, the nurses apparently did not try to
show that their compensation declined.145 Nor could they
prove section 2 conspiracy because neither hospital controlled
a substantial portion of the anesthesia market—though again
the court should have looked at the market for anesthesia
nurses, not the product market.146
In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation involved
a challenge to the NCAA’s rules limiting the award of scholarships to players.147 The court incorrectly referred to the labor
market at issue as a “product market.”148 However, it recognized that a market for “skilled amateur football players” was
properly alleged and thus denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.149 However, the case later collapsed when the court
denied a motion for class certification, as we will discuss
below.150
3.

Clayton Act, Section 7

Product markets. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits
stock and asset acquisitions where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.”151 While those injured by such mergers
may sue for relief, private litigation has been crowded out by
143

See Thomsen, 680 F.2d at 1267.
5 F. Supp. 2d 694, 698 (D. Minn. 1998), aff’d, 208 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2000).
145
See id. at 701–03.
146
Id. at 710–11.
147
398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1146–47 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
148
Id. at 1150.
149
Id.
150
In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., No. C04-1254C, 2006 WL
1207915, at *15 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2006).
151
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
144

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-5\CRN501.txt

unknown

Seq: 31

28-AUG-20

2020] WHY HAS ANTITRUST LAW FAILED WORKERS?

8:34

1373

government involvement. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,152
large firms that plan to merge must first give notification to the
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission. DOJ/FTC
approval typically forecloses private litigation.
For horizontal mergers, the government asks whether the
merger will take place in a concentrated product market and
will significantly increase the concentration of that product
market.153 If so, the merger is illegal unless the merging companies can show that the merger will produce offsetting efficiencies that lower prices for consumers.154 In 2017, a typical
year, the FTC and DOJ investigated fifty-one mergers; the FTC
challenged twenty-three of them and generated fifteen final orders, six of which resulted in the abandonment or restructuring of the merger, and two of which resulted in administrative
or federal court litigation.155 The DOJ challenged eighteen of
the mergers, resulting in six abandonments and one
restructuring.156
Labor markets. In stark contrast, the government has
never—not in 2017, not ever—blocked a merger or even evaluated a merger based on its labor market effects.157 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not explicitly contemplate
evaluation of mergers based on labor market effects or even
mention the problem of labor market monopsony.158 (However,
the Guidelines do apply to input markets and therefore in principle to labor markets.) The legal approach would mirror the
product-market analysis that the Guidelines describe: ask first
whether the firms operate in concentrated labor markets and, if
so, whether their merger would significantly increase concentration in those labor markets. There is significant empirical
evidence that mergers have done just that.159
152

Id. § 18a.
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 7.1.
154
See id. § 10.
155
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017 at 2, 5 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-competition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/p110014_fy_2017_hsr_report_final_
april_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/76YV-TZ4V].
156
Id. at 2.
157
In United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting), the government did oppose a merger in part based on labormarket effects, but the government’s argument focused on the product market, as
did the court’s decision.
158
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35.
159
Benmelech et al., supra note 10, at 15–18; Prager & Schmitt, supra note
77, at 15–24.
153

R

R
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Because of the government’s failure to review mergers for
their labor market effects and the high visibility of mergers, one
might expect to see substantial private litigation brought by
workers to challenge mergers that would cause layoffs and
wage reductions. But the Supreme Court imposed a major
barrier on such cases in 1975 when it held, in United States v.
American Building Maintenance Industries, that the Clayton Act
does not apply to mergers where one of the merging firms operates entirely within a state rather than across state lines.160
The decision was based on language in the Clayton Act (“engaged in commerce”) that does not exist in the Sherman Act.161
Thus, only mergers between national firms can be challenged.
We have found a single section 7 case based on labor market monopsony. In International Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, Local Lodge No. 1821 v. Verso Paper
Corp., a group of former employees who had been laid off from a
paper mill in advance of its sale sued to enjoin the buyer from
consummating the merger.162 The court held that the employees lacked antitrust standing even though normally a merger
that reduces labor costs by eliminating competition for workers
would harm employees in just the way that antitrust laws are
meant to prevent.163 But the court’s error was understandable. The plaintiffs had argued that the merger would simultaneously concentrate the product market (coated printing
paper) and “the market for the specialized labor provided by
plaintiffs that have been trained to work in paper production.”164 But, as far as the opinion suggests, the plaintiffs focused on the product market side and said little about the
labor market. As a result, the court seemed to think the employees sought standing to challenge the product market
harm.165 But courts do not give employees standing to sue
firms for wrongdoing that is directed at others, here, consumers. The court did give the employees standing in their capacity
as purchasers of paper but never addressed the merits of the
labor market argument.166

160
161
162
163
164
165
166

United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 285–86 (1975).
Id. at 283.
80 F. Supp. 3d 247, 251 (D. Me. 2015).
Id. at 269, 276.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 277.
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In 2018, the FTC’s chairman announced that it would begin reviewing mergers for their effects on labor markets.167
Thus, the long drought may come to an end.
B.

What Accounts for the Scarcity of Labor Monopsony
Cases?

1.

The Baseline

We say that labor monopsony cases are rare, but a natural
response is compared to what? If we had made this claim several years ago, the response would have been that labor monopsony cases are rare because labor markets are normally
competitive. Such a response is no longer possible, but the
question remains. A natural starting point for thinking about
labor market litigation is product market litigation. Labor market litigation is certainly rare compared to product market litigation, as Figure 2 shows.
FIGURE 2
ANTITRUST CASES OVER LAST THREE YEARS
180
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Note: Section 1 and 2 counts are based on searches of the Antitrust database in
Westlaw. See supra notes ??? for search terms. Section 7 counts (for labor markets, the number is zero) are taken from the DOJ and FTC, see supra note ???.

Our question, then, is what accounts for this litigation
gap? A number of possibilities suggest themselves.
Theory. One possible argument is that as a matter of economic theory, firms have a stronger incentive to seek control
167
Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Joseph Simmons, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission).
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over product markets, which allows them to raise prices, than
labor markets. However, the two types of incentives are symmetrical. A firm that controls labor markets increases profits
by reducing labor costs, while a firm that controls product
markets increases profits by raising prices. The effect on the
bottom line is the same.
The empirical prevalence of monopolized markets. Another
theory is that product markets are more numerous than labor
markets, or that product markets are more concentrated than
labor markets are. However, there is no reason to think that
product markets are more numerous than labor markets.
There are many nationwide product markets, involving commodities like oil, goods like cars, and so on, and very few nationwide labor markets.168 That said, there are also many local
product markets, and we have not found anyone who has bothered to count them up. For labor markets, the CZ * SOC definition suggests as many as 267,546 labor markets; if we count
only labor markets with at least 100 employed workers, then
this number falls to a still-high 173,653. Sixty percent of the
labor markets in the top 200 occupations (representing 90% of
all vacancies)—more than 70,000—are highly concentrated
and more than eight million people work in those markets.169
Even if product markets outnumber labor markets, we would
surely expect more than a handful of labor market cases.
With respect to comparative market concentration, labor
markets are probably more concentrated than product markets
are because they tend to be more local. As just noted, 60% of
U.S. labor markets have an HHI above 2,500; 25% of labor
markets have an HHI above 7,200.170 We do not have comparable figures for all product markets, but if we focus on manufacturing in 2012, product market HHI is 411 on average,
compared to 3,955 for the labor market HHI weighted by local
employment.171
Conventional (but dated) wisdom in economics, and data
limitations. A third theory is that lawyers have brought relatively few labor market cases because economists have told
them that labor markets are usually competitive, and until
recently, the statistical evidence of labor market monopsony
has been limited. Indeed, much of the evidence has become
available only in the last several years. In contrast, evidence of
168
169
170
171

See Manning & Petrongolo, supra note 127.
See Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum & Taska, supra note 10, tbl. 1.
Id. at 13.
See id. at 3, 18.

R
R
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concentration in product markets has been available for quite
some time. We suspect, in addition, that the economic advances in understanding product markets have been driven
forward by product market litigation, which has financed it, in
a self-reinforcing cycle. Because so little labor side litigation
has taken place, research on labor monopsony has lagged.
Legal hostility/uncertainty. The scarcity of labor monopsony litigation has left behind a thin trail of case law. Another
self-reinforcing cycle may be at work. Because there is more
product-side litigation than labor-side litigation, there is more
product-side case law, and thus product-side outcomes are
easier to predict. Because lawyers understand product-side
law better than labor-side law, they are more likely to bring
product-side cases, which further develops product-side law.
The evidence for this theory is strong. We have already
seen the courts’ struggles with labor monopsony cases. In
some cases, they make basic errors, not even realizing that
labor markets are different from product markets.172 In others,
misled by the mirror-image analogy of product-market analysis, they conduct the labor analysis backward.173 In nearly all
the cases we have found, the labor market definition is superficial, even when the courts accept it. Plaintiffs fail to describe
the geographic limits of the labor market;174 do not distinguish
different labor markets within a class;175 fail to defend their
labor market definitions;176 and so on. In other cases, the
courts have rejected reasonable market definitions because
they assume that labor markets are broader than they in fact
172
E.g., In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144,
1150 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (referring incorrectly to the labor market as a product
market).
173
Todd v. Exxon Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
174
E.g., Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No.
17-CV-358-GKF-FHM, 2017 WL 6597512, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2017) (“Complaint is silent as to the geographic market, and includes no facts upon which an
inference of the relevant geographic market may be based.”).
175
Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199, 202 (2d Cir. 2001).
176
See, e.g., Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 2017 WL 6597512, at *5–7
(dismissing the claim because the plaintiff’s labor market definition—”specialized
engineers”—was insufficiently specific, failed to refer to the interchangeability of
the engineers working for each firm, and lacked a geographic market); Hanger v.
Berkley Grp., Inc., No. 5:13-cv-113, 2015 WL 3439255, at *10–(W.D. Va. May 28,
2015) (dismissing case because plaintiffs failed to defend geographic scope of
market); Mooney v. AXA Advisors, LLC, 19 F. Supp. 3d 486, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(rejecting labor market definition because of lack of “discussion about the insurance agent labor supply, the existence of other insurance agents that are not
affiliated with AXA, potential barriers to entry into the insurance agent market, or
systemic barriers that might prevent an agent from changing insurance
employers”).
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are.177 Finally, a few of the cases are difficult to explain as
anything other than judicial skepticism, or at least uncertainty
about how to address arguments in the absence of well-developed case law.178
A striking example is Llacua v. Western Range Ass’n,179 a
case that was decided by the Tenth Circuit shortly before this
Article went to press. The plaintiffs were foreigner workers who
had entered the United States with agricultural work visas to
work as sheepherders on ranches throughout the United
States. The ranchers used two organizations that they controlled to recruit workers, which was permitted by U.S. law.
However, according to the complaint, the ranchers also authorized the organizations to offer wages, which the organizations
fixed at the minimum allowable by law. While this behavior
would be a straightforward wage-fixing agreement in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the antitrust claims.180
The Court’s main argument was that the complaint failed
to allege facts “from which it can be inferred ranches needed to
offer more [than the legal minimum wage] to attract a sufficient
number of qualified workers.”181 Moreover, the conspiracy
made no “economic sense” because the ranchers “had no ra177
Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2001). But see Rock
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:12–cv–1019–JMS–DKL, 2013 WL 4479815,
at *14 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (accepting labor market definition despite problems); Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 862 F. Supp. 2d 603, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(recognizing that a labor market could be composed of nurses who work for
hospitals and not, as the defendant argued, nurses who work for non-hospitals as
well).
178
An egregious example is Maderazo v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LP, where
a court denied a motion for class certification because it believed that the experts
failed to establish causation—that the alleged wage-fixing conspiracy caused
harm to the class members. No. SA-06-CA-535-OG, 2019 WL 4254633, at *9
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2019). The real grounds for the court’s decision was not class
certification—obviously, causation is a common issue—but failure of proof of
causation. The problem was that while the experts could show that the wages
were lower than the competitive level, they could not tie the wage reduction to a
specific act—since the allegation was that the defendants had held numerous
meetings over a period of time during which they negotiated wage commitments.
But it is hard to see how any wage-fixing case (or even price-fixing case) could
survive this judge’s skepticism. For a more mundane example of judicial caution
in light of uncertainty, see Paul Gift, UFC Hearing: Judge Calls for Expert Witness
and Joe Silva Questioning, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/paulgift/2018/12/20/ufc-hearing-judge-calls-for-expertwitness-joe-silva-questioning-mma-news/#4dca24119024 [https://perma.cc/
4MRJ-XYQE].
179
930 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2019).
180
Id. at 1169.
181
Id. at 1181.
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tional economic motive” to “depress wages paid by their competitors in other states.”182 But it is simply an economic error
to claim that competitors are allowed to fix prices as long as
those prices attract “sufficient” customers. Competitors are
supposed to bid against each other, so that they end up charging customers less than those customers are willing to pay and
workers more than they are willing to work for. The uniform
wage—at the legal minimum, to boot—was overwhelming evidence of conspiracy. The conspiracy made economic sense because all competitors saved money on labor costs; this, again,
is exactly what happens in any antitrust conspiracy.183
Government neglect. A large portion of private product-side
litigation piggybacks on government investigations and litigation, which both uncover otherwise unknown antitrust violations and establish useful precedents.184 The near absence of
government enforcement of antitrust law in labor markets until
very recently thus helps explain the scarcity of private litigation. Even today, the government’s attitude toward labor monopsony claims reflects a degree of skepticism. Early in 2019,
the Department of Justice filed notices in several class actions
in which it argued that the franchise no-poaching agreements
being challenged should be evaluated under the rule of reason
rather than the per se rule.185 While the Justice Department’s
argument is not absurd from a legal perspective, the application of the rule of reason makes private litigation harder in
practice, thereby cementing monopsony power. The government’s interventions in private litigation signal skepticism toward these claims.
Class actions: incentives and law. Private litigation against
monopolists takes two forms: class actions and litigation
brought by corporate rivals or victims. Class actions are financed by lawyers and so are risky and expensive. In the case
182

Id.
The opinion can be contrasted to Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., where the
court denied the motion to dismiss under a similar set of facts, except involving
nannies rather than sheepherders. 176 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1088 (D. Colo. 2016).
But the case was distinguished by a rare “smoking gun”—the plaintiff’s investigator was told by the director of one of the defendants that the defendants agreed to
fix wages. Id. at 1074. Such “direct” evidence is extremely rare in antitrust cases.
184
One study found, based on a sample of forty large cases that led to a
recovery, that twenty-six of those cases were initiated by the government. See
Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement:
An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 897–98 (2008).
185
Bryan Koenig, DOJ Gives Fast-Food Chains Ammo Against No-Poach Suits,
LAW360 (Jan. 29, 2019, 9:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123203/
doj-gives-fast-food-chains-ammo-against-no-poach-suits [https://perma.cc/
3HPZ-MKVW].
183
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of product markets, however, class actions are often nationwide—because product markets are often nationwide—and
thus offer potentially enormous damages.186 In contrast, the
classes in labor market cases are usually small—involving a
geographically limited group, often just a town or city, and
hence a lower level of damages.187 Thus, lawyers will naturally
be oriented toward product-side class actions.
Moreover, employees may have more trouble with class
certification than consumers and other product-side victims
do. In a consumer-side class action, plaintiffs usually allege
that the defendant has charged a supracompetitive price.188
Class members are thus similarly situated—they bought the
same goods, and all paid a price higher than they should have.
Subtle variations—for example, volume discounts, or price
changes—can be handled algorithmically. In contrast, employees who bring labor-side cases typically differ from each other
along numerous dimensions. One court, in denying a motion
for class certification, noted that:
The types of injury Plaintiff alleges are (1) decreased salaries
and (2) deprivation of new job opportunities. In order to
prove these types of injury, a number of individual determinations would have to be made. Defendants point out that
resolution of each claim would depend on the consideration
of several factors; for example, whether the employee’s contract was the result of arms length negotiation, whether a
covenant not to compete was included in a particular employee’s contract; the employee’s salary history, educational
and other qualifications; the employer’s place of business;
the employee’s willingness to relocate to a distant competitor,
and their ability to seek employment in other industries in
which their skills could be utilized (e.g., pharmaceuticals,
cosmetics).189
186

See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 4.2.2.
See Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 208 F.3d 655,
658–59 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[P]laintiffs assert that the sole-source contracts were part
of a ‘grand conspiracy’ by Minnesota anesthesiologists” to eliminate competition
in the Twin Cities.).
188
See e.g., White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 574 (1st Cir. 2011)
(“[P]laintiffs in this case complain that the prices for gasoline on Martha’s Vineyard have been artificially high due . . . to an illegal price-fixing conspiracy . . . .”);
In re Dig. Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ motive to conspire was to support their ability to
charge supracompetitive prices . . . .”).
189
Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 144 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d, 84
F. App’x 257, 257 (3d Cir. 2004); see, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig.,
985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1186 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that class certification
does not require proving that each element of the claim is susceptible to classwide proof); see also Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001)
187

R
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Other antitrust classes have had more luck.190 And outside of
antitrust law, courts have been more willing to certify classes.191 But the broader point stands. Because products are
simpler and more homogenous than workers, product-side
class actions will be more common than labor-side class
actions.
Lack of information. Class action lawyers face another incentive to focus on product markets. Consumer prices are
public information, and price increases frequently receive public attention.192 Sellers may try to disguise price increases by
reducing quality—for example, selling cereal in smaller boxes,
offering more limited warranties for consumer electronics, increasing waiting times for consumer support, or breaking
promises to protect data. But these quality variations also attract public attention, as consumers complain and the media
catch on. In contrast, most employers keep aggregate wage
information confidential, and while individual workers may report their wages to the media or to lawyers, the variations
across an entire work force can more easily be kept secret. Yet
without this information, lawyers may be reluctant to launch a
class action.193
(noting the difficulties that plaintiffs will face in obtaining class certification because of differences among class members); Maderazo v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LP, No. SA-06-CA-535-OG, 2019 WL 4254633, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 22,
2019) (denying class certification because experts could not prove causal impact
of alleged conspiracy); Reed v. Advocate Health Care, 268 F.R.D. 573, 592, 594
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (denying class certification because of variation in wages paid to
class members); Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., No. 1:06–CV–765, 2008 WL
2945993, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) (“Interchangeability and job mobility in
the nursing profession, and the reasons affecting the wage of a particular nurse or
class of nurses, though contested, involve too many variables and provide too
much ambiguity to carry a motion for class certification on the issue of injury-infact.”); In re Comp. of Managerial, Prof’l, & Tech. Emps. Antitrust Litig., No.
02–2924 (AET), 2003 WL 26115698, at *4 (D.N.J. May 27, 2003) (similar). However, other courts disagree.
190
Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270, 317 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (animation workers); Cason-Merenda v. VHS of Mich., Inc., No. 06-15601,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29447, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2014) (reinstating class
certification order on remand following Sixth Circuit post-Comcast reversal); In re
High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (high-tech employees);
Cason-Merenda v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 528, 549 (E.D. Mich. 2013)
(nurse wages—Detroit); Fleischman, 2008 WL 2945993 at *7 (nurse wages—
Albany).
191
See Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803, 830 (2015) (noting that lower
courts who remain sympathetic to class action claims for employment discrimination find ways around Wal-Mart).
192
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 7, at 13.
193
We have heard this explanation in conversations with private litigators who
have been involved in labor monopsony cases.
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Arbitration clauses and the absence of natural corporate
plaintiffs. A further problem for both consumer and employee
class actions is that firms frequently use arbitration clauses to
block class action litigation. The Supreme Court has validated
this practice for antitrust claims.194 However, these clauses
cannot be used to block litigation brought by well-funded corporations that are not in privity with the firm in question, and
hence antitrust cases brought by corporate plaintiffs can continue. These cases compose a large fraction of product-side
litigation. But there are few such cases on the labor side.195 A
possible explanation is related to the small size of most labor
markets. If a firm tries to raise entry barriers by tying up the
local labor supply with noncompetes and other arrangements,
then the plaintiff who sues that firm is likely to be itself a small
firm. A large firm, such as a manufacturer, can locate factories
elsewhere and thus is not constrained to compete in the local
market. A firm that needs a local labor force to serve a local
market will often be relatively small.
***
Antitrust law has failed workers. The problem is less the
statutory law, which is broadly worded, than the doctrine developed by courts, which has been oriented toward productmarket litigation, and the inexperience of judges and litigators
with labor monopsony cases. The weakness of the law raises
the suspicion that the wave of mergers that has taken place
over the last several decades, as well as other anticompetitive
practices, might have been partly driven by a corporate strategy of obtaining anticompetitive returns in labor markets. After all, if the government and private litigators are focused on
product-market behavior, a rational profit-maximizing corporation would search out rents in labor markets. We now turn
to some proposals for correcting this state of affairs.
III
PROPOSALS
We make four proposals. First, employees should be permitted to bring section 1 claims against employers based on
parallelism. Second, employees should be given more latitude
to bring section 2 claims against labor monopsonists. Third,
194

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013).
For a rare example, see Aya Healthcare Serices, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare,
Inc., No. 17cv205-MMA (MDD), 2018 WL 3032552, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 19,
2018).
195
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the FTC and Justice Department should incorporate labormarket analysis into their review of mergers, and private claims
by employees against merging firms should also be strengthened. Fourth, employers should not be permitted to foreclose
antitrust class actions by including arbitration clauses in employment contracts.
A. Section 1
1.

Parallelism

Black letter law says that plaintiffs cannot advance a claim
against antitrust defendants based on mere “parallelism” or
“conscious parallelism.”196 Parallelism occurs when two or
more competitors maintain above-competitive prices by (for example) adopting pricing strategies of matching the other party’s
price. They keep prices high through unilateral behavior
rather than through agreement. Many commentators have
criticized this legal rule because it allows firms to engage in
anticompetitive conduct that hurts buyers.197 The Supreme
Court has, however, adamantly resisted calls for reform. The
problem, first identified by Donald Turner, is that there is no
clear judicially manageable remedy for parallelism.198 A court
could issue an injunction requiring the defendants not to engage in parallel pricing, but it would be hard to determine
whether they are or not. It is in the nature of pricing that the
seller must pay attention to the prices of other sellers, and a
court would normally be unable to determine what the competitive price is. By contrast, if an agreement exists, the court can
enjoin it and punish the parties for entering the agreement.
A similar point could be made about parallel wage setting.
Imagine that one firm announces the wages that it pays its
workers, and other firms match the wage. Workers at one or all
the firms sue, arguing that the firms coordinate to keep wages
low. A court might have difficulty fashioning a remedy for the
same reason as in the case of parallel pricing: it may be impossible for the court to determine whether a firm ignores or pays
attention to the wages of other firms and to issue an enforceable order directing the defendants to ignore them. But the logic
does not apply in all settings. Consider, for example, another
196
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 7; William H. Page,
Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 593,
594–(2017).
197
LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 443–53 (2013).
198
Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 669–71 (1962).
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common form of parallel behavior—nonpoaching. Firm A does
not hire from Firm B, and Firm B does not hire from Firm A. It
is likely that if Firm A and Firm B both employ large workforces
and frequently hire people, a plaintiff could establish with statistical methods that Firm A turns down qualified applicants
from Firm B—that is, applicants who are as qualified as the
applicants from outside Firm B that Firm A hires. An antitrust
violation thus could be established, and an appropriate remedy—based on the but-for world in which Firm A uses the same
standards for all applicants—could be formulated. Indeed, the
same tools that are used to show invidious discrimination in a
disparate impact employment discrimination case could be
used in the antitrust context.199
For an example, consider Kelsey K. v. NFL Enterprises LLC,
where the court rejected both a no-poaching and wage-setting
allegation based on parallel conduct.200 The plaintiffs, a class
of cheerleaders, tried to establish the no-poaching allegation by
pointing out that no club had ever hired a cheerleader away
from another club even though the skills employed by cheerleaders are easily transferred from one team to another.201 The
court held that the refusal to hire could have been merely parallel conduct—an agreement was not necessary.202 The court
should have taken the no-poaching allegation more seriously.
The problem of proof and remedy in the price-setting and possibly wage-setting context was not present in this case. If cheerleaders routinely applied for positions at other clubs and were
routinely refused, this should be a prima facie case of a section
1 violation. The teams could defend themselves by showing
that they had applied the same employment criteria to applicants who belonged to other clubs and applicants who did not.
An employer can rebut a disparate impact claim by showing, using statistical methods, that the low representation of a
group in its labor force reflects demographic constraints, for
example, the low representation of that group in the labor market from which the employer draws.203 When a plaintiff claims
parallel or reciprocal no-poaching, the employer would similarly be able to rebut the claim by showing that its labor force
has the same proportion of former employees from the plain199

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971).
No. C 17-00496 WHA, 2017 WL 3115169, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2017),
aff’d, 757 F. App’x 524, 526 (9th Cir. 2018).
201
See id. at *4.
202
Id. at *6.
203
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6 (pointing out that between whites and blacks,
many fewer blacks had the high school education required by the employer).
200
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tiff’s employer as from other employers, controlling for other
variables.
A flat ban on labor-side antitrust cases brought on the
basis of parallel practices is unwise. Courts should recognize
section 1 cases based on parallelism when statistical analysis
shows that the parallel behavior harms labor competition.
2.

No-Poaching Agreements in Franchises

In the last year, plaintiffs have brought class actions on
behalf of workers at franchises like McDonald’s and Jimmy
John’s, arguing that these franchises have used no-poaching
agreements in order to suppress competition.204 The McDonald’s no-poaching agreement reads:
Interference With Employment Relations of Others. During the
term of this Franchise, Franchisee shall not employ or seek to
employ any person who is at the time employed by McDonald’s, any of its subsidiaries, or by any person who is at the
time operating a McDonald’s restaurant or otherwise induce,
directly or indirectly, such person to leave such employment.
This paragraph [ ] shall not be violated if such person has left
the employ of any of the foregoing parties for a period in
excess of six (6) months.205

A franchise that violates this provision is subject to a range of
sanctions from McDonald’s, including termination if repeated
violations occur.206 In the McDonald’s case, the class representative, Leinani Deslandes, alleged that she was employed by
a McDonald’s franchise in a managerial position for $12 per
hour.207 After her original employer frustrated her efforts to
obtain training for a higher-level position, she applied for a
managerial job at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant that offered
$13.75 per hour, rising to $14.75 after three months. The
store manager expressed interest in Deslandes’ application,
but she was later told by a McDonald’s official that the store
could not hire her without the consent of her original employer,
who refused it because she was “too valuable.”208 She eventually quit and went to work for Hobby Lobby for $10.25 per
hour, the lower wage reflecting the fact that “some of the skills
[Deslandes] developed as a manager of a McDonald’s outlet
204
See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 790
(S.D. Ill. 2018); Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL
3105955, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018).
205
Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *2 (brackets in original).
206
Id.
207
Id. at *3.
208
Id.
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were not transferable to management positions at employers
outside of the McDonald’s brand, so she had to start over at the
bottom elsewhere.”209
The franchise cases raise several novel issues for antitrust
law. First, when the franchisor imposes within-franchise nohire obligations on the franchisees, do these obligations count
as vertical agreements or horizontal agreements? If they are
vertical agreements, then they are subject to the rule of reason
standard, which favors the franchise.210 If they are horizontal
agreements, they are presumptively subject to the per se standard, which favors the employees.211 Antitrust policy reflects
deep skepticism of agreements between competitors, while
agreements among firms in different positions on a distribution
chain may produce efficiencies.212 In the Jimmy John’s case,
the court seized on the contractual right of franchisees to sue
each other for violating the no-poaching obligation, which has
a horizontal feel.213 Unfortunately, the distinction between
horizontal agreements and vertical agreements is hopelessly
tangled. The type of formalism employed by the Jimmy John’s
court will simply cause firms to rewrite the franchise contractor
so that the franchisor alone enforces the obligations.
Second, does it matter that these agreements are “intrabrand,” that is, between firms that are contractually bound
by the franchise agreement rather than between independent
firms? In product market cases, agreements that restrict trade
within a brand are not subject to per se analysis because they
can facilitate competition across brands.214 If McDonald’s
owned all its restaurants rather than contracted with franchisees, then it would be impossible to argue that restrictions on
employee mobility would violate the antitrust laws, which do
not apply internally to the operation of a firm.215 Why should
matters change if McDonald’s operates through franchises?
One possibility is that unions can more easily organize against
a single large firm than multiple independent franchises; thus,
it might seem fair that if McDonald’s can counter unionization
209

Id.
See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 793
(S.D. Ill. 2018) (“Vertical agreements, however—those made up and down the
supply chain—are generally subject to a more lenient ‘rule of reason’
analysis . . . .”).
211
See id. at 792 (“Horizontal agreements . . . are typically per se violations of
Section 1 . . . .”).
212
See Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 156–59.
213
Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 796.
214
Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54–55 (1977).
215
See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984).
210
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by organizing itself as a franchise, it should be subject to antitrust law. But it seems to us that one cannot answer this
question without examining the market conditions in which
McDonald’s operates.
Third, and getting closer to these economic realities, one
needs to ask whether these no-poaching obligations are likely
to be pro- or anticompetitive. The McDonald’s court made several pertinent observations. McDonald’s’ no-poaching agreement applied to low-skill workers as well as managerial
workers, and it applied to workers whose training took place in
the distant past as well as workers whose training was recent.216 Thus, it was not tailored to the presumed business
justification—to protect each restaurant’s investment in its
employees’ training. Moreover, “[g]iven that most individuals in
the low-skill employment market do not have the luxury of
being unemployed by choice for six months, the no-hire provision effectively prevented competing McDonald’s franchises (as
well as the company-owned stores) from competing for experienced, low-skill employees.”217
This type of analysis begins to look like a rule of reason
analysis. McDonald’s could insist that Deslandes show that
the labor market was concentrated because if it were not,
Deslandes could have found an equally good job. The low
Hobby Lobby wage might simply have shown that she did not
look hard enough, or that she valued other amenities at Hobby
Lobby more than the lost income. As a first step in refuting this
argument, Deslandes would need to show that the labor market was concentrated. While this would not necessarily be difficult, the court noted that “allegations of a large number of
geographically-small relevant markets might cut against class
certification.”218 And if a class cannot be certified, we can be
sure that Deslandes’ claim, however meritorious, will never be
vindicated. Even trebled, $2.75 per hour in damages will not
finance a single expert report on market conditions.
Thus, the law may be inadequate to the job of policing
labor market conditions. We suggest a few strategies for addressing this problem. First, courts should accept commuting
zones for the purpose of labor market definition in section 1
cases. This would address the class certification problem
noted by the McDonald’s court. Second, courts should keep an
216
Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018).
217
Id. at *1.
218
Id. at *8.
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eye out, as the McDonald’s court did, for no-poaching obligations in franchise contracts that are untailored to the skill-level
and responsibility of employees or that apply to low-skill employees. Within-franchise no-poaching obligations may be justified in narrow cases, for example, involving managerial
employees who are given access to proprietary information
about the franchise’s method of business or who have received
intensive training at the franchise level; when they are broad,
they should trigger the per se rule. This approach seems to us
more fruitful than the tangle over vertical versus horizontal
restrictions.219
3.

Why Section 1 Standards Should Be Relaxed for Labor
Markets

Our two section 1 proposals imply that section 1 standards
should be relaxed when workers challenge a labor monopsony.
But why exactly? One might believe that section 1 should be
applied to labor markets in the same way as it is applied to
product markets.
The answer is that collusion appears to be easier in labor
markets than in product markets, because labor markets are
often more concentrated than product markets are. The idea
that collusion is easier in more concentrated markets is one of
the main justifications for hostility toward mergers in already
concentrated markets, which is embodied in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.220
Consider a product-side duopoly in which two firms maintain prices through parallel behavior. Each firm must still
worry that the other firm will compete on quality or service or
by offering secret discounts. In contrast, the two firms in a
labor-side duopoly know that each firm’s labor force is unlikely
to switch firms—because of search frictions and job differentiation as well as the lack of competition by other employers.
Firms cannot compete much on quality because working conditions are fairly uniform—they are not constantly changing as
a result of new technology the way that products are. And
while firms can compete for workers by offering signing bonuses, they take the risk that they will offend pay equity norms
219
It also brings the analysis of no-poaching agreements in line with the
treatment of covenants-not-to-compete, which are usually unenforceable when
they are untailored and almost always unenforceable when imposed on low-skill
workers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); id.
cmts. c, d.
220
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 7 (discussing coordinated effects in concentrated markets).
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if the bonuses become widely known221—as they must if serious competition is going to take place. Thus, the more reliable
form of competition is through the wage, and parallel behavior
can stop it.
The greater risk of collusion in labor markets because of
their high level of concentration justifies relaxed standards for
section 1 in labor market cases because the risk of false positives—wrongfully imposed antitrust liability—is correspondingly lower than in section 1 product market cases.
B.

Monopsony

Section 2 also needs to be reformed. The problem is not
the statutory language but the paucity of cases that provide
guidance for employees who are the victims of anticompetitive
behavior by monopsonists. To remedy this problem, we suggest that Congress pass a more detailed version of section 2 as
applied to labor monopsonists.222 The law should include the
following reforms.
Labor market definition. Plaintiffs would be permitted to
allege labor markets based on the six-digit SOC and a commuting zone. If plaintiffs allege such a labor market, the burden
would switch to the defendant to show that the labor market
definition is inappropriate.
By standardizing the labor market definition, the proposal
would make it easier for plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss
and certify class actions. By creating a presumption that is
rebuttable, the proposal would enable defendants to prevail
when labor markets are idiosyncratic. In rare cases when labor
markets are national in scope, for example, the labor market
for CEOs of large firms, an employer would be able to refute a
labor market definition based on a commuting zone by providing evidence that workers send significantly more than 20% of
their applications outside the commuting zone. (Research
shows that workers who seek jobs on average send 20% of their
applications outside the commuting zone.)223 So we would require evidence that the job search in this occupation is significantly broader than average.
221
David Card, Alexandre Mas, Enrico Moretti & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality
at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2981,
3001–02 (2012) (finding that workers dislike pay inequality within firms when
paid below the median for their unit and occupation).
222
For details of the proposal and a discussion, see Marinescu & Posner,
supra note †, at 8–18.
223
See Marinescu & Rathelot, supra note 127, at 47 fig. 1.
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Labor market power. Plaintiffs would satisfy the market
power requirement that is typically imposed in section 2 cases
by proving that the employer has a “large” share of the labor
market. How large is “large”? On the product market side,
courts nearly always accept 90%, usually accept above 70%,
and occasionally accept shares around 50% or higher.224 We
think that similar figures could be used for the labor market
side. Plaintiffs could satisfy these requirements in either of two
ways: based on the employer’s percentage of employment or
based on the employer’s percentage of job postings.
This reform would again simplify and render more predictable labor monopsony cases.
Anticompetitive behavior. Plaintiffs would be able to base
their case on any of the following anticompetitive acts: mergers
in highly concentrated markets; use of noncompete and related
clauses; restrictions on employees’ freedom to disclose wage
and benefit information; unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act;225 misclassification of employees as
independent contractors; no-poaching, wage-fixing, and related agreements that are also presumptively illegal under section 1; and prohibitions on class actions. Of course, current
law gives employees the theoretical right to allege these types of
anticompetitive behavior, but the cases show a pattern of judicial skepticism, as noted earlier.226 Codification would help
employees by compelling courts to take these claims seriously.
Employers would be allowed to rebut a prima facie case of
anticompetitive behavior by showing that the act in question
would likely lead to an increase in wages.
This reform would strengthen and extend section 2 actions
against labor monopsonists by standardizing a list of anticompetitive acts. While not all of these acts are invariably anticompetitive, the employer would be able to defend itself by citing a
224
See, e.g., Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d
683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[L]ower courts generally require a minimum
market share of between 70% and 80%.”).
225
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2018). The Supreme Court expressed skepticism
when a union brought an antitrust case against an employer who had tried to
divert business to entities it controlled that were not unionized, allegedly to
weaken the bargaining power of the union. The Court commented that this behavior “might constitute . . . an unfair labor practice . . . but in the context of the
bargaining relationship between the parties to this litigation, such activities are
plainly not subject to review under the federal antitrust laws.” Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526–27
(1983). While the relationship between labor law and antitrust law is complex, we
do not think antitrust claims should be ruled out when the alleged anticompetitive act is also an unfair labor practice.
226
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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business justification. For example, a noncompete could be
justified because it protects an employer’s investment in training. If so, an employer could avoid antitrust liability by showing that its use of noncompetes benefits workers, who obtain
higher wages as a result of their training.227
Statutory damages. To increase incentives to bring laborside antitrust actions, employees would be entitled to the
greater of damages of $10,000 per employee or the harm imposed on each employee.
These reforms would strengthen section 2 claims against
labor monopsonies but would also preserve the doctrinal structure of section 2. Thus, they would not generate significant
legal uncertainty or require a revision in the way that we think
about antitrust law.
C.

Merger Review

As we have argued elsewhere, the DOJ and FTC should
review mergers for their labor-market effects as well as for their
product-market effects.228 Under the current approach, the
agencies focus exclusively on the product market.229 They first
determine the HHI of the product market.230 Then they calculate the HHI of the post-merger product market. If the initial
HHI and the increase in the HHI are high, the merger is deemed
presumptively illegal. The merging firms may nonetheless obtain approval if they can show that the merger will produce
significant efficiency benefits (typically, through the exploitation of economies of scale) so that consumer prices will decline.
Roughly the same analysis can be used on the labor market side. The agencies should calculate the HHI of the labor
market in which the firms operate and the increase in HHI
post-merger. If HHI and the HHI increase are sufficiently high,
then the merger should be presumptively blocked. The merger
would nonetheless be approved if the firms can show that the
merger would allow them to obtain efficiencies that would result in a wage increase.
227
For evidence that noncompetes harm workers in monopsonistic labor markets and not in more competitive labor markets, see Starr et al., supra note 4, at
28–29.
228
Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1042; Naidu, Posner & Weyl,
supra note 11, at 547–49. Both papers go into significantly more detail about how
merger review should be conducted, and readers interested in those details
should consult them.
229
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 4.
230
See id. § 5.3.

R
R
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Note that the labor-market effects would need to be determined for every market in which the firm employs workers. A
large national firm that employs workers in many different
commuting zones would need to show that concentration is not
significant, or would not significantly increase, in all of those
zones—or otherwise spin off separate employers in the zones in
which concentration would be unacceptable. This would parallel the practice for product market mergers—for example, when
nationwide retail chains merge, and the implications for concentration are examined in every geographic product market in
which stores are located.
Finally, Congress should abrogate United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, the case that interpreted
the Clayton Act not to apply to within-state mergers.231 Plaintiffs should be allowed to challenge such mergers.
While analysis of labor market effects is complex and many
mergers are justified,232 our proposal simply extends the current product-market approach to labor markets. This reform is
long overdue.
D.

Arbitration Clauses

In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the
Supreme Court held that firms could use arbitration clauses to
block class actions in antitrust cases.233 That case involved a
product-side market. Merchants who claimed that American
Express had violated antitrust law were required to honor the
arbitration clauses in the contracts they had signed with American Express. The Court recognized that these clauses might
prevent victims of corporate wrongdoing from vindicating
claims involving small sums but considered itself bound by the
policy of the Federal Arbitration Act.234 The logic of the case
suggests that it applies to labor settings as well, as the Court
later acknowledged.235 Employers can (and do) easily insert
arbitration clauses in employment contracts for the purpose of
231

See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 285–86 (1975).
See David P. Wales et al., The Unlikely Role of Labor Markets in Merger
Antitrust Review, BLOOMBERG L., (Nov. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/insight-the-unlikely-role-of-labor-markets-in-merger-antitrust-review?context=search&index=0 [https://
perma.cc/9JZ4-RVPD].
233
570 U.S. 228, 233, 235–36 (2013).
234
Id. at 235–38.
235
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018).
232
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defeating class action litigation based on antitrust claims—and
they have done so with increasing frequency in recent years.236
Italian Colors was an enormous setback to antitrust litigation. It allows a monopolist (or monopsonist) to immunize itself
from antitrust challenges by contractual partners by demanding that they sign an arbitration agreement. The problem—
which is familiar from many different antitrust settings—is
that it may be individually rational for a single buyer or seller to
agree to an arbitration clause that forecloses antitrust liability
because part of the harm is borne by third parties—including
potential rivals of the monopolist and their future customers.
The problem is even more serious for labor-side antitrust
because nearly all such cases are brought by workers who have
contractual relationships with employers. In contrast, a great
deal of product-side litigation is brought by corporate plaintiffs—including contractual parties who are large enough to
reject arbitration clauses and competitors and other companies that do not have contractual relationships with the antitrust violator. Thus, we propose that Congress pass a law
abrogating Italian Colors for labor monopsony cases.
CONCLUSION
Adam Smith, the patron saint of free-market economics,
could have been writing today when he set down these words
about labor monopsony more than two centuries ago:
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters; though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever
imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is
as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always
and every where [sic] in a sort of tacit, but constant and
uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above
their actual rate. To violate this combination is every where
[sic] a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a
master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and
one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever
hears of. Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate.
These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen
yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though se236
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 5–6 (2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-ofmandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60million-american-workers/ [https://perma.cc/QFR9-TK83].
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verely felt by them, they are never heard of by other
people.237

While employment markets have changed greatly since the
eighteenth century, the employer combinations identified by
Adam Smith were aided by an essential condition—the concentration of labor markets—that has not changed. These hidden
employer combinations occasionally rise to public attention because of a scandal like the high-tech no-poaching agreements
but are largely invisible, or were—until statistical research
brought them to light.
In light of the statistical evidence, we know that a litigation
gap exists: antitrust law neglects labor monopsony—a severe
problem that calls out for public resources—and it should not.
Using product-market litigation as a baseline, we show that the
amount of labor-market litigation falls far short of what one
could reasonably expect.
The explanation for this state of affairs is not simple. Many
factors play a role—the state of economic wisdom until recently, the development of new datasets and modes of statistical analysis, the incentives of class action lawyers, the limits of
antitrust law, among other things. As economic understanding
of labor monopsony advances, the law needs to catch up.
Courts should recognize certain types of conscious parallelism as unlawful under section 1 despite their normal insistence on an agreement on the product side. They should also
block firms from avoiding section 1 liability by exploiting the
vertical nature of the franchise form. Congress should tighten
up section 2—courts and lawyers can do their part as well by
using the latest economic wisdom to evaluate labor monopsony
cases. The FTC and the Justice Department should review
mergers for labor market effects. And Congress should block
employers from using arbitration clauses to protect themselves
from antitrust class actions.
Legal academics also need to catch up. The imbalance
between product-market litigation and labor-market litigation
is matched by an imbalance in legal research on product-market antitrust (which is voluminous) and legal research on labor-market antitrust (which is puny).238 We have scratched
the surface of a vast topic that would benefit greatly from additional research by legal scholars.
237
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 70–71 (1776).
238
We have thumbed through numerous antitrust treatises and student
guides and found virtually no mention of labor monopsony.

